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Abstract
The purpose of this paper is twofold: to define the problem of thick
representation and to show that the problem is a puzzle for representation
rather than a puzzle for a specific art form or art, in general, as has
previously been suggested. In the course of identifying and formulating the
problem, I shall demonstrate why the solution proposed thus far fails to
solve either the artistic problem at which it is aimed or the representational
problem I define. I conclude by indicating two promising directions in which
a solution might be found and by explaining the philosophical and critical
significance of finding a solution.
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1. Conspicuous representation

Privacy

In “Realism and Representation: The Case of Rembrandt’s Hat,” Michael
Morris uses Rembrandt’s Self-Portrait with Two Circles (1660) to illustrate
the concept of conspicuous representation. Conspicuous representations
are “ways of representing the real world which call attention to their own
medium of representation.”[1] They are contrasted with self-effacing
representations, in which “an effort is made to prevent the medium calling
attention to itself, or when the use of the medium follows some over-familiar
formula.”[2] Significantly, conspicuous representations not only draw
attention to their medium but also to that which they represent. In his selfportrait, Rembrandt represents his hat with thick, greasy, white paint that
fails to cover the darker background completely. Morris maintains that it is
impossible not to see Rembrandt’s simple strokes of creamy paint qua paint
but they nonetheless constitute an especially effective representation of a
cloth hat. The representation is puzzling because it is both conspicuous, in
drawing attention to itself as paint, and vivid, in revealing the character of
the hat:
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…artistic representations are often particularly effective at
presenting the character of something in the real world
precisely in virtue of calling attention to some feature of the
medium of representation… .[3]
Morris is concerned with representational art, in general, rather than
painting, but his paper is focused entirely on pictorial representation. In
disambiguating conspicuous representation from related issues, for
example, he distinguishes it from Richard Wollheim’s seeing-in and Robert
Hopkins' inflected seeing-in.[4] The question of seeing-in concerns the way
in which three-dimensional objects are represented on two-dimensional
surfaces and is related to what E.H. Gombrich describes as “the essential
paradox of painting, which is that it represents depth on a surface.”[5]
Furthermore, Morris names no other work of art in his paper and does not
refer to Self-Portrait with Two Circles by name but the only other example
discussed is of “a trompe l’oeil violin painted on the back of a door in a great
house,” which seems to either refer to or have been inspired by Jan van der
Vaardt’s Trompe l’oeil of a violin and bow hanging on a door (c.1723).[6]
Morris’ examples and argument thus focus on painting, and the extension of
his thesis of conspicuous representation to art, in general, is reliant on
essentialist assumptions about works of art for which he fails to argue and
which I do not wish to assume here. I shall therefore restrict his thesis to its
strongest version, as a thesis about painting, and augment it with another
example, Picasso’s representation of a violin in Violin and Grapes (1912).
Gombrich employs Picasso’s still life as a paradigmatic example of a cubist
work, describing the painting as representing the way in which one thinks of
a violin, that is, of different aspects simultaneously, with some more distinct
than others.[7] In Morris’ terms, Violin and Grapes both draws attention to a
feature of the representation, the juxtaposition of shapes on the canvas, and
presents the character of real violins. I shall leave open the question of
whether the cubist style is particularly suited to conspicuous representation.

Picasso, Violin and Grapes (1912)

Morris distinguishes between the psychological and philosophical questions
raised by the phenomenon of conspicuous representation and restricts his
interest to the latter. He sets out the problem of conspicuous representation
in terms of the truth of both of the following two contradictory propositions:
(A)
Good conspicuous representations enable us to
understand the world as it is in itself.[8]
(B)
Conspicuous representations can only enable us to
understand the world as it stands to their own means of
representation.[9]
Rembrandt and Picasso’s respective works seem to tell us something about
real cloth hats and real violins (A), but the fact that they draw attention to
the thickly applied paint and carefully arranged shapes on the canvases
suggests that they can only tell us about hats and violins in relation to
textures and shapes (B). The problem that Morris sets out to solve is thus
about the cognitive value of conspicuous representation.
Before casting the problem in my own terms and examining Morris’s
solution, there are two points about his example that require clarification. If
one compares Self-Portrait with Two Circles with the self-portrait
Rembrandt completed earlier in the same year, Self-Portrait at the Easel
(1660), he appears to be wearing a similar or identical hat.[10]

Rembrandt, Self-Portrait with Two Circles (1660)

Rembrandt, Self-Portrait at the Easel (1660)

The comparison between the representations of the hat in each painting
serves as a nice illustration of Morris’ point. One does not need to see the
actual painting in Kenwood House to realize that the white paint in SelfPortrait with Two Circles “is applied thickly, almost in slabs” in a way that
draws attention to the brushstrokes on the canvas.[11] Rembrandt was,
however, in the habit of leaving some parts of his paintings crudely depicted
in comparison with the rest, creating an unfinished appearance. Gombrich
uses the example of Jan Six (1654), where Rembrandt “left the hand in the
glove as a mere sketch” in contrast to the rest of his friend, who is depicted
in lifelike detail.[12]

Rembrandt, Jan Six (1654)

The question of whether Rembrandt is attempting to draw attention to the
medium of painting in Self-Portrait with Two Circles or is, as Gombrich puts
it, exercising his right to decide when the painting is finished is not,
however, relevant to Morris’ thesis that excludes both artistic intention and
the expression of emotion or attitudes as relevant.[13]
A detailed discussion of artistic technique is beyond the scope of this paper
but the contrast between Rembrandt’s hat and Six’s gloved hand offers a
ready answer. Although there is a sense in which both representations are
crudely sketched rather than finely detailed, the hat, due to the features
identified by Morris, draws attention to the paint in a way that the hand does
not. My conclusion is that the property of being unfinished, however that is
construed, is neither a sufficient nor a necessary condition of conspicuous
representation.
The second point concerns what Morris calls reflexive representations,
“representations which are concerned to represent features of their own
medium of representation: paintings in which painters are at work painting,
for example.”[14] Unlike Self-Portrait at the Easel, Self-Portrait with Two
Circles does not depict Rembrandt actually at work, as he has turned away
from his canvas and adopted a pose, but there is nonetheless a sense in
which the painting draws attention to its medium of representation in a way
that Jan Six does not. The point is better illustrated by paradigmatic
examples of reflexive representations, such as Velázquez’s Las Meninas
(1656) and Magritte’s Attempting the Impossible (1928). Morris
distinguishes the issue raised by conspicuous representation from the
issues raised by reflexive representation. Once again, comparison can be
employed to offer evidence for his claim. The way in which the
representation of the hat in Self-Portrait with Two Circles and the
representation of Velázquez painting a portrait in Las Meninas draw
attention to the medium of painting is entirely different. My conclusion is that
the property of being reflexive is neither a sufficient nor necessary condition
for conspicuous representation.

Velázquez, Las Meninas (1656)

2. Poetic representation
In The Event of Literature, Terry Eagleton identifies a paradox characteristic
of the linguistic medium of representation, which he refers to variously as
“the idea of the self-flaunting sign,” the “paradox of the poetic sign,” and the
paradox of “the dual nature of language.”[15] Unlike Morris, Eagleton is not
setting out a problem preparatory to presenting one or more solutions but
articulating a paradox that is at least partly constitutive of the poetic or
literary medium of representation. The paradox nonetheless poses a
problem for a specific literary genre, literary realism, and my discussion of
Eagleton’s work will focus on this problem. Eagleton introduces the idea of
the self-flaunting sign while attempting to delineate a plausible concept of
literature, noting the difference between obtrusive, or conspicuous, and selfeffacing literary styles, typified by authors such as Flaubert and Hemingway,
respectively. In a manner reminiscent of Morris’ treatment of reflexive
representations, Eagleton is quick to point out that the obtrusive style
cannot be reduced to self-referentiality and quotes Britain’s Banking Act
1979 as an example of a text that has failed to attract poetic interest despite
its explicit self-reference.[16] He explores the obtrusive style by articulating
the paradoxical nature of the referential relations of the self-flaunting or
poetic sign, where the latter appears to be a sub-category of the former.
The poetic use of language appears to both loosen the link between word
and world by drawing attention to the poem as a representation, and
increase the referential power of the words by means of its formal
density.[17] Eagleton regards the paradox of the poetic sign as the
paradigm of a more basic paradox of the linguistic sign:
There is a paradox involved in the dual nature of language.
This is the fact that the more rigorously one specifies, the
more general possibilities one evokes. To depict a thing in all
its singularity means laying language on thick; but this then
swaddles the thing in a dense web of connotations and
allows the imagination to play freely around it.[18]
The paradox is caused by the ambiguity of meaning, the combination of
denotation and connotation essential to linguistic representation. As
Eagleton’s initial name for the paradox suggests, this ambiguity is not
exclusive to linguistic signs or linguistic representations. A picture of a
bulldog can signify both a breed of dog and a nation state. The ambiguity
may be more prominent in linguistic signs, however, due to the necessary
absence of resemblance, that is, 'bulldog' resembles neither a bulldog nor a
nation, but a picture of a bulldog standardly resembles an actual bulldog. In
his book, Eagleton’s concern is restricted to linguistic signs, so he is not
required to make a more general claim; I shall return to this question in
Section 3. The paradox of the linguistic sign is exacerbated in poetry but is
symptomatic of the poetic sign rather than problematic: “The more thickly
textured the poem’s language, the more it becomes a thing in its own right,
yet the more it can gesture beyond itself.”[19] For Eagleton, the paradox
only becomes a problem in the genre of literary realism. The realist author
attempts to represent the real world by means of language and creates a
representation where “what looks free-floating and particularized is covertly
ordered into a more 'typical' or generic set of fables, characters and
situations.”[20] The relation between the particular and the general presents
the following problem for the author:

Because the general attitudes of a realist text are incarnate
in its concrete particulars, those particulars need to be
realised as compellingly as possible. Indeed, literature is the
“thickest” description of reality that we have. Yet this may
have the effect of undercutting the work’s overall way of
seeing, drawing the reader’s eye from that to the details that
instantiate it. The text needs to allude to more than itself, but
not at the expense of the very specificity which renders such
allusions pervasive. The concrete is the medium of the
general, but can always end up obstructing it.[21]
The realist author aims to explore and develop general or universal subjects
and themes by means of compelling concrete particulars. Flaubert, for
example, explores the ethics of powerlessness by means of his thick
descriptions of everyday domestic life in Madame Bovary (1856).[22]
These thick descriptions generate their own interest, however, and this
interest is at odds with and can threaten to overwhelm or obstruct interest in
the theme. The tension between particular and universal that realist authors
must negotiate is supervenient on the tension between denotation and
connotation in linguistic representation. In attempting to draw attention to the
real world, authors employ thick descriptions that draw attention away from
the real world to the medium of representation.
The problem for literary realism is similar to Morris’ problem of conspicuous
representation, which is consistent with Morris’ claim that conspicuous
representation occurs across all art forms. I shall set out the problem in a
way that mirrors Morris’ formulation while remaining faithful to Eagleton’s
conception. Realist poets aim to represent the world as it is, that is, in all its
detail and complexity. In consequence of the way in which concrete
particulars are realized in linguistic representation, realist poetic
representations are typically thick, that is, rich in formal features such as
structure, morphology (the patterns of word formation), syntax (the rules of
sentence formation), meter (the arrangement of words in regularly
measured, patterned, or rhythmic lines or verses), and tropes (all literary or
rhetorical devices that use words in other than their literal sense). These
formal features draw attention to the poetic medium of representation. The
philosophical problem arises with the apparent truth of both of the following
contradictory propositions:
(1)
Poetic representations of reality draw attention away
from their medium of representation to the world.
(2)
Poetic representations of reality draw attention away
from the world to their medium of representation.
I shall call this the problem of poetic representation.
3. Thick representation
Thus far I have discussed two kinds of artistic representation, conspicuous
and poetic. My concern is with modes of representation rather than art
forms, however, so the kinds in which I am interested are pictorial
representation and linguistic representation, which I define as:
(1)
Pictorial representation: the representans, a picture,
either a painting or a photograph, represents the
representatum, an object, either physical or abstract, by
means of depiction.
(2)
Linguistic representation: the representans, a series
of words, either written or spoken, represents the
representatum, an object, either physical or abstract, by
means of description.
Drawing on Eagleton’s claims that poetic language is thick in texture and
literary language, the thickest description of reality available, I shall apply
Gilbert Ryle’s thick/thin distinction to representation. Recall that Morris
distinguishes between conspicuous representations that draw attention to
their medium of representation, and self-effacing representations that draw
attention away from their medium of representation. Morris notes two ways
in which a representation can be self-effacing: either the artist makes an
effort to prevent the medium from drawing attention to itself or the artist
employs an over-familiar formula. In the latter case, representations draw
attention away from their medium of representation by employing wellestablished conventions that do not require interpretation or are so familiar
that interpretation is automatic. With this in mind, I employ the thick/thin
distinction as follows:
(1)
Thick representation: a representation that draws
attention to its representans, that is, to the medium of
representation.
(2)
Thin representation: a self-effacing representation
that draws attention to its representatum, that is, to the
subject of representation.
There are four points to note about this distinction. First, both Morris’
conspicuous representations and Eagleton’s poetic representations are

thick representations. Second, the thick/thin distinction is gradational rather
than categorical. Third, thickness and thinness are antagonistic properties
such that a representation cannot be both thick and thin, and the extent to
which a representation is thick is inversely proportional to the extent to
which it is thin. Finally, the distinction is neutral with respect to artistic
representation. Thickness may be a necessary or a sufficient condition of
artistic representation but classification as art or non-art is beyond the
scope of the problem in which I am interested.[23]
My concern in this paper is with the cognitive value of representations,
which I define as follows:
Cognitive value: a representation is cognitively valuable to
the extent that it provides knowledge of the world as it is in
itself.
My definition employs Morris’ contrast between knowledge of the world as it
is in itself and knowledge of the world as it stands to the particular medium
of representation. I do not deny that the latter is knowledge or has cognitive
value; it is simply not the kind of cognitive value in which I am interested
here. Returning to my example in section 1, no violin, not even one that has
been disassembled, looks like Picasso’s thick representation of a violin in
Violin and grapes. Similarly, Erich Auerbach makes the following
observation concerning a passage in chapter twelve of the second part of
Madame Bovary:
This is not at all a naturalistic representation of
consciousness. Natural shocks occur quite differently. The
ordering hand of the writer is present here, deliberately
summing up the confusion of the psychological situation in
the direction toward which it tends of itself – the direction of
“aversion to Charles Bovary.”[24]
Auerbach is commenting on a specific passage, but the ordering hand of
the writer is obvious in most, if not all, thick linguistic representations. The
relation I am proposing between thickness/thinness and cognitive value, as
defined above, is thus:
(1)
The cognitive value of a representation is directly
proportional to its thinness.
(2)
The cognitive value of a representation is inversely
proportional to its thickness.
If (1) and (2) are correct, then one would expect thick representations to be
poor vehicles for providing knowledge about the world as it is. The
comparison of thick and thin representations of a similar representatum
suggests that this is not always the case. Consider the following
comparison, the pictorial pair taken from Kendall Walton:[25]
(1)

Representatum: the horror of war.

Thick representation: Goya’s “Even Worse” (1810), part of
his The Disasters of War.
Thin representation: Timothy H. O’Sullivan’s photograph,
Death on a Misty Morning (1866).
(2)

Representatum: Dublin on June 16, 1904.

Thick representation: Joyce’s Ulysses (1922).
Thin representation: The Irish Times for June 16, 1904.
It seems that, in at least some cases, thick representations can have a
higher cognitive value than corresponding thin representations. Gombrich
and Auerbach both gesture towards this phenomenon in their respective
commentaries on Violin and grapes and Virginia Woolf’s To the Lighthouse:
(1)
“And yet this strange medley of images represents
more of the ‘real’ violin than any simple snapshot or
meticulous painting could ever contain.”[26]
(2)
“In both excurses we are dealing with attempts to
fathom a more genuine, a deeper, and indeed a more real
reality.”[27]
Recall from section 1 that the problem Morris is seeking to solve is how
artistic representations are often particularly effective at presenting the
character of something in the real world precisely in virtue of calling
attention to some feature of the medium of representation. That is the
problem of conspicuous representation. Recall from section 2 that the
problem Eagleton identified for the realist author was that, in attempting to
draw attention to the real world, he or she employs thick descriptions that
draw attention away from the real world to the medium of representation.
This is the problem of poetic representation. Both the phenomena of
conspicuous representation and poetic representation are instantiations of
thick representation as defined above. The problem with which I am
concerned, the problem of thick representation, can be set out in the form of

a paradox containing three propositions for whose plausibility I have argued
but which are nonetheless mutually inconsistent:
(1)
Thick representations draw attention to their
representans.
(2)
Drawing attention to the representatum is a
necessary condition of cognitive value.
(3)

Some thick representations are cognitively valuable.

4. Morris’ solution
Morris sets out the problem of conspicuous representation in terms of the
following pair of contradictory propositions:
(1)
Good conspicuous representations enable us to
understand the world as it is in itself.
(2)
Conspicuous representations can only enable us to
understand the world as it stands to their own means of
representation.
He claims that both propositions are true and solves the problem by
demonstrating that (1) and (2) are not contradictory by means of a third
proposition:
(3)
Conspicuous representations enable us to
understand the world as it is in itself as it stands to their own
means of representation.[28]
Morris maintains that (3) shows not only the point of conspicuous
representation but the point of artistic, as opposed to non-artistic,
representation.[29] Morris reaches (3) by returning to the question of the
cognitive value of conspicuous representation and amending (Cog) to
(Cog2):
(Cog) The basic virtue of conspicuous representation is that
it enables us to understand the world.[30]
(Cog2) The basic virtue of conspicuous representation is that
it reveals what it represents as the object of its own medium
of representation.[31]
By “the object of its own medium of representation,” Morris means that the
conspicuous representation reveals the opportunities and challenges that
the particular representatum poses for the particular representans and the
way in which they are exploited and overcome by the artist. In conspicuous
representations, “we are forced to reconsider the relation between the
medium and the object of representation.”[32] In other words, Morris has
amended his initial claim that Self-Portrait with Two Circles and Violin and
Grapes enable us to understand cloth hats and violins to the claim that the
respective paintings enable us to understand the opportunities and
challenges cloth hats and violins present for painters.
The revised proposition (3) is clearly true but equally and clearly an
unsatisfactory solution to the problem. First, (Cog2) verges on the trivial.
Paintings that draw attention to their representans do enable us to
understand the opportunities and challenges the representatum presents to
the painter but so do self-effacing pictorial representations. Even the most
self-effacing representation represents a physical or abstract object and, in
so doing, reveals its representatum as the object of its representans. When
one looks at Death on a Misty Morning or, to take a photograph that
represents colors accurately and is thus less likely to draw attention to its
representans, Kevin Carter’s Struggling Girl (1993), one is not under the
illusion that one is actually in the presence of the casualties of war and
famine depicted. The only obvious exception to this rule is trompe l’oeil,
which seems to have the potential to be completely self-effacing, at least on
initial viewing. If one grants this, then, aside from trompe l’oeil
representations, (Cog2) and, therefore, (3) are true of most representations,
even if conspicuous representations may provide a more sophisticated
understanding than self-effacing representations.
Second, compare the violin in Violin and Grapes with, for example, Frans
Hals’ more readily recognizable violin in Daniel van Aken Playing the Violin
(1640).

Hals, Daniel van Aken Playing the Violin (1640)

Hals’ representation of a violin provides an accurate depiction of what it is
like to see a real violin from a particular angle, and an accurate depiction of
real motion, Van Aken’s light touch with the bow, in a static medium.
Picasso’s representation of a violin looks, as I mentioned in section 1,
nothing like a real violin but the effect of presenting the violin from several
angles at once enables the understanding to which Gombrich alludes,
mentioned in section 3. The different understanding of violins enabled by
Hals and Picasso cannot be explained by attributing (3) to Picasso’s work
because Violin and Grapes enables more than an understanding of the
relationship between violins and painting. (1) is more appropriate than (3)
because Violin and Grapes enables us to understand the various
constitutive properties of the concept violin, that is, violins as they are. By
contrast, (3) is more appropriate in describing the cognitive value of Hals’
work because Daniel van Aken Playing the Violin enables us to understand
the perspectival problem of representing an object, the neck of the violin,
that is pointed at the viewer, which is solved by foreshortening.
In summary, Morris’ solution to the problem of conspicuous representation
is unsatisfactory because, although it is true, it fails to account for the
cognitive value of conspicuous representations in two related ways: by
failing to distinguish the cognitive value of conspicuous representations from
self-effacing representations and by making an erroneously deflationary
claim about conspicuous representations. An application of Morris’ solution
to the problem of conspicuous representation to the problem of thick
representation would involve a straightforward rejection of the second
proposition, that is, drawing attention to the representatum is a necessary
condition of cognitive value, on the basis that drawing attention to the
representans is cognitively valuable in the sense of (Cog2), that is, revealing
the representatum as the object of the representans. As such, the criticism I
have made of the conspicuous representation solution can be reiterated:
(Cog2) is neither a satisfactory account of the cognitive value of
conspicuous representations nor a satisfactory account of the cognitive
value of thick representations.
5. New solutions?
As noted in section 1, Morris differentiates conspicuous representation from
both seeing-in and inflected seeing-in. The problems of thick representation
and seeing-in are similarly different, but Hopkins’ inflected seeing-in and
Michael Newall’s related imbrication are nonetheless suggestive of a
resolution to the paradox with which I am concerned. Seeing-in refers to the
twofoldness of the visual experience of pictures, as contrasted with the
visual experience of objects.[33] Wollheim’s proposal is that unlike seeing a
cloth hat, for example, seeing a painting of a cloth hat involves seeing both
the surface of the painting and the cloth hat in that painted surface. He
initially conceived of twofoldness in terms of two simultaneous experiences
but his subsequent conception of a single experience with two aspects has
become the standard account.[34]
Hopkins’ employs Dominic McIver Lopes’ distinction between the design of
a picture and the scene visible in the picture.[35] According to Lopes,
design refers to “those visible surface properties in virtue of which a picture
depicts what it does.”[36] Design is thus what Morris is attending to when
he writes of seeing Rembrandt’s simple strokes of creamy paint qua paint.
Hopkins claims that inflected seeing-in occurs when “what is seen in a

surface includes properties a full characterization of which needs to make
reference to that surface’s design.”[37] He uses Rembrandt’s sketch of Jan
Cornelisz Sylvius (1646) as an example of inflected seeing-in, stating that
one does not just see a hand in the sketch but a hand constituted by
strokes of ink.

Rembrandt, Sketch of JC Sylvius (1646)

The contrast with seeing-in seems to be something like this. In seeing-in,
one sees, for example, the gesture of a right hand (scene) in the
photograph (design) of Dorothea Lange’s Migrant Mother (1936), and that
gesture can be characterized without reference to the paper or emulsion
used to produce the photographic print. In inflected seeing-in, one sees the
gesture of a left hand (scene) in Rembrandt’s sketch (design), but the
gesture cannot be fully characterized without referring to the ink on the
paper, specifically the brushstrokes that flow upwards, in contrast to the
downward flow of the strokes constituting the robe, and outwards, towards
the viewer. In other words, in order to characterize the properties of the
representatum (moving hand) fully, one must refer to the properties of the
representans (the way the ink has been applied to the paper), that is, one
must see the ink-strokes qua ink-strokes in order to see not only the hand
but the gesture that the hand is making.
Michael Newall proposes a particular type of inflected seeing-in that he calls
imbrication, in his discussion of the relationship between seeing-in and
transparency/opacity.[38] Imbrication indicates “the appearance of a
picture’s subject matter when textural features of brushwork are attributed
to the surface of the subject matter rather than the picture.”[39] Imbrication
thus occurs when the features of the brushwork, for example the thick,
greasy slabs applied by Rembrandt, are attributed to the represented cloth
hat (scene/subject matter) rather than the canvas (design/picture). Newall
takes another of Rembrandt’s self-portraits, Self-Portrait as the Apostle Paul
(1661), as an example, noting the way in which the brushstrokes depict
Rembrandt’s turban, face, and hair:
Where tone and texture are laid down in the same strokes,
as we see in those sections of Rembrandt’s self-portrait that
I have mentioned, the elements of the depicted texture and
actual texture will be similar in size and orientation, and so
they are attributed to a single surface, that of the subject
matter. Here the textures of the paint appear imbricated with
the subject matter in its own space. This creates the
appearance of a composite texture, comprised of the texture
that the picture is depicted as having through the
manipulation of tone, and the texture of the paint, which we
also attribute to the depicted surface.[40]

Rembrandt, Self-Portrait as the Apostle Paul (1661)

Newall notes that this experience is not twofold in Wollheim’s sense and
that different parts of the same painting may sustain distinct experiences of
imbrication and transparency.[41] In what Newall attributes to analytic
caution, Hopkins restricts his claims about inflected seeing-in to the sketch
of Jan Cornelisz Sylvius, but that sketch, in particular, and the phenomenon
of imbrication, more generally, seem to offer paradigmatic examples of thick
representation, that is, representations that draw attention to their
representans. It is also interesting that Morris and Hopkins employ works by
Rembrandt independently of each other and Morris and Newall employ selfportraits by Rembrandt independently of each other. There is something in
that artist’s style, it seems, that succeeds in providing knowledge of the
world as it is in itself, in spite of, or perhaps in virtue of, drawing attention to
the representans of his works. As such, the research on inflected seeing-in
suggests that drawing attention to the representatum is not a necessary
condition of cognitive value for paintings and sketches. The question of
whether this approach can be applied to linguistic representation and thus
provide a solution to the problem of thick representation remains to be
explored.
Nelson Goodman claims that resemblance is neither a sufficient nor a
necessary condition of representation.[42] The relationship between a
representation and that which it represents is denotation: “A picture that
represents – like a passage that describes – an object refers to and, more
particularly, denotes it.”[43] Denotation is contrasted with exemplification,
and the relationships are explained in terms of labeling and sampling. Any
representation can, for example, be used to denote redness but only a red
thing can be used as a sample of redness.[44] ‘Red’ thus denotes red in
virtue of the referential relation between the word and the color, whereas a
tailor’s swatch of cloth exemplifies red in virtue of being red, that is,
possessing the property of redness, like the bolt of material of which it is a
sample. The red swatch also refers to red, however, and exemplification is
possession of redness, plus reference to redness.[45] In other words,
“denotation implies reference between two elements in one direction while
exemplification implies reference between the two in both directions.”[46]
Reference in red occurs in one direction, from the word to the color, and
reference in the tailor’s swatch in two directions, from the swatch to the
color and from the color to the swatch. I have used red and a tailor’s swatch
as convenient examples of denotation and exemplification, respectively, but
I could equally have used the drawing and ‘red’ typed in red font instead. In
this case, the former would refer to red without possessing the property of
redness and the latter would both refer to the color and possess the color.
The problem of thick representation is concerned with how, for example,
Rembrandt’s slabs of creamy white paint provide knowledge about cloth
hats in spite of drawing attention to themselves qua paint. Exemplification,
understood in terms of possession, is suggestive of an explanation. The
representation of Rembrandt’s hat in Self-Portrait at the Easel appears to
be a case of denotation, that is, the paint on the canvas denotes the cloth
hat. In Self-Portrait with Two Circles, the paint on the canvas not only
denotes the cloth hat but appears to possess certain properties in virtue of
which it provides more knowledge of the clothiness of the hat. Goodman
employs his conception of exemplification to explain expression, claiming:
“What is expressed is metaphorically exemplified.”[47] What is expressed is
therefore possessed, and he is explicit that “the property belongs to the

symbol itself.”[48] Expression and exemplification are both distinct from and
opposed to representation and description: “a passage or picture may
exemplify or express without describing or representing, and even without
being a description or representation at all.”[49] Goodman summarizes his
conception of expression as displaying rather than depicting or describing,
the means of communication employed by representation.[50] In these
terms, one might say that Rembrandt’s painting depicts the hat and displays
its clothiness.
One of the appealing features of Goodman’s theory is that it is intended to
apply to all media of representation and, perhaps more readily than
answers that may emerge from inflected seeing-in, can be just as easily
brought to bear on linguistic representation. The naturalistic representation
of consciousness in Madame Bovary upon which Auerbach comments both
refers to Emma Bovary’s thoughts and expresses her aversion to her
husband:
But it was above all at mealtimes that she could bear it no
longer, in that little room on the ground floor, with the
smoking stove, the creaking door, the oozing walls, the
damp floor-tiles; all the bitterness of life seemed to be served
to her on her plate, and, with the steam from the boiled beef,
there rose from the depths of her soul other exhalations as it
were of disgust. Charles was a slow-eater; she would nibble
a few hazel-nuts, or else, leaning on her elbow, would
amuse herself making marks on the oilcloth with the point of
her table-knife.[51]
What is of particular interest here is that the passage quoted contains no
explicit aversion to Charles Bovary, as the only mention of him is the neutral
comment on his eating, but the descriptions of the room, the food, and
Emma’s actions combine to express her aversion. Exemplification may thus
be able to demonstrate that drawing attention to the representatum is not a
necessary condition of cognitive value in either pictorial or linguistic
representation. If exemplification is to provide a solution to the problem of
thick representation, however, the way in which displays provide knowledge
of the world as it is in addition to, or in virtue of, depiction and description
will require detailed explanation.
6. Conclusion
The purpose of this paper has been to identify a problem rather than
provide a solution and to field questions rather than answers. If my
argument that there is a single problem underlying the problems of
conspicuous and poetic representation is convincing, then the most
important question has yet to be answered: why does the problem of thick
representation matter? There are three answers to this question, each of
which is both independent of the others and significant enough to warrant
attention on its own merit. I list them in order of ascending ambition.
First, at least some thick representations are also works of art. A solution to
the problem of thick representation would therefore provide an answer to
the much-debated question of the cognitive value of art or the dispute
concerning aesthetic cognitivism. Thick representations provide knowledge
in a manner that is aesthetically relevant because it is precisely in virtue of
drawing attention to the representans that they provide knowledge of the
representatum. Second, if, as I have claimed, the problem of thick
representation is not a puzzle about one or more art forms but about
representation per se, then a solution would shed light on the mechanism
by which representation operates. That solution may involve an explication
of the relationship between representation and expression, a perennial
issue in both philosophy and criticism, or involve a new direction for
research, exploring the similarities between texture in pictorial and linguistic
representation. Finally, solving the problem of the association of cognitive
value with thick representation has the potential to offer a new theory of
representation that could be applied to both artistic and cultural criticism.
Thick representation is thus not only a genuine problem but one whose
solution is well worth pursuing.
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